I never liked hex & counter games that were not strategic level and someone...

[Settembrini]

How about you keep reading Hegel, Marx and others of that kind, and I go and read that one about deep battle.
Seems ridicully overpriced for less than 300 pages, that´s just one commute with the S (outh American) - Bahn!

StaBi magazines are an epic fail these days, asbestos they say. Hundreds of academics with deadlines are in despair.
Master Students writing their thesis feel social alienation and turn towards drugs.

[Pierce Inverarity]

You mean the book by David Glantz, right? There's also this one, bigger, cheaper, and more recent: Richard W. Harrison, The Russian Way of War: Operational Art, 1904-1940

This wp entry seems to be a paraphrase of the two, but it's too abstract.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_operations

In general, shouldn't the Militaergesch. Forschungsamt in Potsdam have everything in its library?

I learned on TMP that Air Land Battle was derived from it, interestingly enough. The US Field Operations Manual praises it.

[Settembrini]

The MGFA library is for most practical purposes not a lending library.

I´ll go hunting for that stuff anyway. Easier and more fun than Kant for the time being-

[Settembrini]

The wp entry is full of NATO-propaganda, hard to see the forest there. I´ll hunt for Glantz & co and reconsider.

The German entry is a bit more interesting. Seems the whole thing is CLOSELY linked to Clausewitz and Delbrück. Must figure out who was for what and why.

ADD: indirect approach smokestacks.

[Settembrini]

The US Field Operations Manual praises it.

US Generals are full of dangerous shit 9/10 times. Thankfully, the whole of NATO is now trained to be like them. Whoo-hoo! it would only be fitting if the whole Air Land Battle dogmatism was an outcrop of some mental fads of half understood writings.

[ewilen]

Sett, for more on the history of things, do a google search on Tactical Game 3. Among other things it will take you to a Wikipedia article that sorts out some of the developments of tactical games.

[Pierce Inverarity]

Out of curiosity, what's wrong with Air Land Battle?

I dread the answer, but still I feel the question should be posed.

[Settembrini]

I`ve found a nice master narrative, that we will work later on:

from: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA248502&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

Theory of Deep Battle Conducted by Aviation Units
Deep battle is not a new concpt. It evolved from a simple raid by a small ground force
in the early 1800's described by Carl von Clausewitz in On W to complex operations in
the 1990's requiring synchronization of indirect fires, EW assets, BAI sorties, and
attack helicopters.6 Technological advances greatly aided this evolution. Deep battle has
proven decisive in shaping the battlefield by destroying or disrupting enemy forces enroute
to the main battle area.
Clausewitz identified the importance of attacking the enemy's rear area. He wrote that
the Impact of a force could be substantially Increased if directed at the enemy's flanks or
rear. "A threat to the rear can make a defeat muvrazW, as well as ,,na,,si"(
Clausewitz further advocated the use of a "small groupof skillful raiders who must move
daringly in small detachments and attack boldly, assailing the enemy's weaker garrisons,
convoys, and minor units on the march." 8 Technological advances in weaponry and means
of movement enhanced the capability to conduct deep attacks over the next 100 years.
Even though some evolution occurred during the American Civil War, it was not until
the 1920's and 1930's that significant advances in deep attack theory appeared. In 1926
Soviet Field Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevskty presented a new form of deep attack using
aerial assets to transport motorized detachments into the enemy's rear ares.9 In addition
to the demoralizing effect, Tukhachevskiy saw the deep attack disrupting enemy formations
enroute to the front, command and control headquarters, a logistical operations.
In England during this same time period Basil H. Liddell Hart and J.F.C. Fuller developed
theories building upon Tukhachevskiy's proposed use of aviation in deep attacks. Liddell
Hart's "Indirect approach" maximized the capabilities of the aircraft as it conducted aerial
maneuver. 10 An aircraft could rely on moility and speed to avoid the enemy's strengths
while attacking his weaknesses. Aviation's inherent ability to maneuver in three
dimensions, coupled with the increased lethal firepower, provided an excellent means to
execute the "indirect approach" against numerically superior forces. Fuller advocated "a
theory founded on a new degree of movement." I I Tanks and aircraft combined to create
this new movement. The efforts of Tukhachevskiy, Fuller, and Liddell Hart provided a
basis for the conduct of war during World War It.
In the 1 980's vast technological advances in the helicopter provided an opportunity to
redefine deep battle. Facing a numerically superior Warsaw Pact in Europe, the U.S.
Army determined that to win it must attack the enemy throughout the depth of the
battlefield. This realization led to the development of AirLand Battle (ALB) doctrine,
which, even if not a true "maneuver" doctrine, certainly centers on maneuver as the
primary element 12 Exploitation of the aerial dimension, especially the capabilities of
theMAH-64, represented a formidable potential maneuver capability to conduct ALB deep
attacks.
In 1985 Gaeneral Crosbie E. Saint, then III Corps Commander at Fort Hood, formed the
first consolidated AH-64 attack helicopter brigade at corps level and broke new ground in
developing methods of conducting deep attacks. Based on the Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlefield (IPB), General Saint assigned missions to attack helicopter units "to disrupt or
destroy enemy forces to a depth of 150 kilometers as the enemy repositions for integration
into the close battle." 13 He integrated long range indirect fires, EW assets, and BAI
sorties into the deep attack whenever possible. Attack helicopter units conducting deep
operations became an integral part of the ground commander's scheme of maneuver to shape
the battlefield. AH-64 units conducted deep attack missions at nigt to maxim ze the
aircraft's capabilities and take advantage of the enemys lack of night fighting technology.
The attack helicopter units truly became, in Clausewltz's term, "a small group of skillful
raiders." The success of the deep battle provided a crucial link to fulfill ALB doctrine.
The American effort to develop the deep battle using attack helicopters did not go
unnoticed In Europe. General Doctor F.M. von Senger und Etterlin of West Germany and
Brigadier Richard E. Simpkin of 6reat Britain contributed greatly to the ide. In 1983 Yon
Senger und Etterlin delivered a lecture to the Royal United Services Institute in which he
warned the audience against "not taking advantage of the technological advances of attack
helicopters." 14 As Commander-in-Chief Allied Forced Central Europe where Warsaw
Pact forces greatly outnumbered NAIO forces, he predicted a battlefield dominated by a
Main Battle Air Vehicle (MBAV) which possessed superior mobility and firepower over
ground forces. 15 His "Airmechanization" concept employed the MBAV and associated
airmobile forces in deep attacks 200-300 kilometers from an assembly area. 16 Command
of these forces would be at the operational level of corps and army group levels while
control would be decentralized to brigade and battalion levels. Brigadier Simpkin also
became an advocate of the MBAV and "Airmechanization" concepts. He believed that by the
late 1990's NATO's defense would hinge on an MBAV type weapon system and large armor
formations would become obsolete as a result.

[Settembrini]

A potential critique  of AirLand Battle is complex, as it has proven EFFECTIVE in reality. But effective in which way? Here are the dimensions to consider:

- role in the cold war
- effect in the cold war
- ability to model actual, hot warfare
- it´s repercussions on training, equipment and especially mindset of staff officers

The quickest answer, though, is it´s categorization:

AirLandBattle is school of thought that governed Army and especially Air Force PROCUREMENT decisions. I would harshly remind all of us about the typical carreer officer lifepath in the US armed forces of the cold war: quick rise through the ranks, leave as Cpt-Col. and FIND A JOB AT AN ARMS PRODUCER. There´s only criticism of this by junior officers that served as platoon/company leaders in Iraq an Afgahnistan, so there´s hope in ten years.... In short, it´s as close to a military-industrial complex conspiracy as you get in real life.

The role in the cold war was an utterly political one. Move away from tactical nuclear threats towards telling everyone that NATO could defend every inch of Western Europe, by magic silver bullets. "I have some silver bullets for you, right here, at only $45 billion..."

The EFFECT in the cold war was approaching genius, even Clausewitz would approve to some degree [within the framework of cold war; Clausewitz provides many thoughts and sees clear on many subjects of what is now called "game theory"]: Out-pay the East. Simple as that. But when you look at how the whole of NATO generalship ATE up the bluff/myth of AirLandBattle, you wonder if this really was planned in that way.
I overlooked the "deep battle" conncection, but it COULD be interpreted as being a masterfull stroke of bluffing the Soviets by using concepts they understood, taking away their silver bullet and building better ones, faster. This success is horrendeously muddied by the fact that the Soviet forces of the eighties were basically not operational. An NOBODY suspected that. Afghanistan could have been a hint, though.

The intellectual damage on ACUTAL warfare remains! Do I need to point out all the utterly wrong stuff in our above quoted master narrative by some Major who surely became a General? The intellectual fallacies? I can, just say so.

The intellectual damage is the continuation of the "David"-Myth. Or more properly, the "heavy knights were pushed over by fast and nimble riders"-myth, so popular for ages, and replaced fittingly by Liddell Harts indirect approach. In very contemporary events, AirLandBattle has been REPLACED by Network Centric Warfare. Do I need to explain the utter crap and bullshit that that is? It´s the PERFECT continuation of the fast & nimble-myth COUPLED with more IT, counseler and hardware jobs in the defense industry, also leading to ridiculous control freakishness of staff officers.

As we see, AirLAndBattle could be replaced by another doctrine. That tells us legions about it´s relation to the deeper reality of warfare: none.

The thing that, thankfully, seperates AirLandBattle from Network Centric propaganda, is that the military industrial complex produced huge numbers of conventional weaponry, that could as well be used on the front lines, thereby making NATO stronger in general (as is the first law of winning according to Clausewitz), and that is always good. Coupled with the Soviet forces being basically inoperable -> The Cold War is won! But that doesn´t tell us ANYTHING about warfare IF the Soviets had been capable of what everyone thought they were. In another way, the weaknesses of AirLandBattle are OVERSHADOWED by the fact that military spending for it was in ADDITION. The tax payers were the victims.

All together, there´s thought poison in US-military doctrines injected into games. Dogma into the model, dogma comes out of the model. Duh. And as we are gamers, we want the warfare simulated, not the cold war strategems, at least most of the time. Clausewitz said, there are no general rules for defense, there can only be "training of judgement". AirLandBattle etc. is the opposite of "training of judgement".

Some concrete criticisms:
- Capable Air Defense invalidates Deep Battle with air forces. Stingers, Afghanistan, anyone remember?
- Too many High Tech Jets
- Lots of friendly fire (Gulf War 90)
- Attrition overvalued in an environment were the enemy was supposed to have superiority in numbers
- inabilty to understand the INCREASING need for Infanty. This is the most dangerous of all, and it´s a NATO wide problem. Recdution was NOT considered during the cold war, but after...
- Falklands were won by Royal Marines marching while shitting their pants bloody because they had only dirty water, not Exocets or Harriers.
- Although my knwoledge is a bit spotty, I think the wars of former Yugoslavia cannot be explained or modelled with an AirLandBattle mindset.

In fact, if you read Clausewitz closely, you will find that AirLAndBattle would be ONE perfect OFFENSIVE instrument, but does not adress the general problems/strengths of defence itself. Maybe this is why the Soviets were successfully scared into submission by it. Maybe someone up high really knew it was NATO that had superiority even in effective numbers in cetnral Europe. But the Generals surely believed their own myths.
 
ADD: relevant part on "judgement" & defence:

Wir bekennen also, daß wir in diesem Kapitel keine Grundsätze, Regeln oder Methoden anzugeben wissen, weil uns die Geschichte nichts dergleichen darbietet und man dagegen fast in jedem einzelnen Moment auf Eigentümlichkeiten stößt, die sehr häufig ganz unverständlich sind, oft sogar durch Wunderlichkeit überraschen. Aber darum ist es nicht unnütz, die Geschichte auch in dieser Beziehung zu studieren. Wo es auch kein System, keinen Wahrheitsapparat gibt, da gibt es doch eine Wahrheit, und diese wird dann meistens nur durch ein geübtes Urteil und den Takt einer langen Erfahrung gefunden. Gibt also die Geschichte hier keine Formeln, so gibt sie doch hier wie überall Übung des Urteils.

http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/?id=5&xid=324&kapitel=8&cHash=36a606ef9b2

"Combined Arms" is a bit different, I´ll tackle this at another time.

[ewilen]

On the criticism side, I would add the "ride of the apaches" in front of Baghdad (March, 2003). But the helicopter is frankly the Army's settling for the ugly sister. What was important historically and theoretically was that the Air Force was prevented from retiring the A-10.

And on the counter-criticism side: Neither the Falklands nor Yugoslavia are comparable to "the defense of Western Europe". Different terrain, different opposing force. I would note however that the tide was turned in Bosnia with tactical air strikes (Operation Deliberate Force).

Also, aside from air interdiction, the Army had a bunch of other high-tech tricks up its sleeve. My personal favorite was SADARM. It was cut in 1999, but at that point nobody envisioned streams of T-72s moving west anymore.

I would suggest that "Network Centric Warfare" likewise can't be taken as evidence of the failure of AirLand Battle, but simply as a response to developing technology and a changing political situation. It may have helped convince Rumsfeld that Iraq could be not only occupied but pacified and "nation-built" on the cheap, but that's really a whole other argument without much relevance to AirLand Battle.

[ewilen]

Also, I'm a bit out of date with SADARM--I just realized it's not the only weapon of its type in town. Nowadays there are various cluster-bomb weapons delivered by aircraft or cruise missile, that have a similar operation: CBU-97, AGM-154B.

[Settembrini]

I would note however that the tide was turned in Bosnia with tactical air strikes (Operation Deliberate Force).

Well, bombing third grade militaries with total air superiority on your side does not need any doctrine to work out pretty well. What is key to my current and personal view on these samples is that there is next to no evidence that there is actually such a thing as working air denial/interdiction with so few planes.

SADARM and the A-10 are great examples of general strength that derived from AirLandBattle. But don´t forget, that´s just a tiny fraction of the funds! IIRC, there´s still no real replacement for the A-10, it is not built since long ago and the ground forces in actual combat cry for more Thunderbolts since 2002. But look at all the C3 equipment that´s overhauled and newly introduced Forces-wide in regular intervals...

[ewilen]

Crap, lost my post. Will have to retype later.

[Settembrini]

Keep in mind that we are talking about AirLandBattle as a pure procurement decision guideline.

[ewilen]

Not sure I understand. In actual practice, the way things basically work(ed) since Carter is: Republican administrations don't really follow guidelines, they just buy everything. Sometimes they resurrect projects just to thumb their noses at their predecessors (B-1). And they also fund every R&D idea. DIVAD is the only project I can recall being eliminated under Reagan or the Bushes.

Dems then cut stuff that doesn't work and/or doesn't make sense in the current/foreseeable strategic environment (F-22, Osprey).

* * *

Air interdiction with few planes: maybe. I know that the Air Force planned for (that is, hoped for) a huge exchange ratio on the "first pass". Beyond that, it's an issue of aircraft ranges and ability to destroy aircraft on the ground and/or put holes in runways. The best evidence that such could work is the Arab-Israeli wars (and note: cruise missiles, advanced PGMs, HARM improved since 1973).

A-10 has done its job, first holding off the Russians and then assisting in the destruction of the last mass-tank army that the US is likely to face for quite some time, excluding North Korea. The Air Force wanted to take them out of service altogether; now they're being upgraded to keep working until 2028. Again, changes in plans post-Cold War don't tell us whether decisions made in the 1980s were right or wrong.